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Abstract 15 
This paper presented both experimental and numerical assessments of separation gap effect on 16 
vented explosion pressure in and around the area of a tank group. A series of vented gas 17 
explosion layouts with different separation gaps between tanks were experimentally 18 
investigated. In order to qualitatively determine the relationship between the separation gap 19 
distance and explosion pressure, intensive computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulations, 20 
verified with testing data, were conducted. Good agreement between CFD simulation results 21 
and experimental data was achieved. By using CFD simulation, more gas explosion cases were 22 
included to consider different gas cloud coverage scenarios. Separation gap effects on internal 23 
and external pressures at various locations were investigated.  24 
25 
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1. Introduction 29 
Physical layout of element spacing is one of the primary issues of Liquefied natural gas (LNG) 30 
project modeling (Taylor, 2007). The internationally recognized standard NFPA-59A (NFPA-31 
59A, 2016)  and European standard EN-1473 (EN-1473, 2016) are often used to ensure code 32 
compliance of the plant spacing issue. The separation spacing requirements for tanks are 33 
specified based on the empirical calculations by considering the volume of the tanks and the 34 
allowable heat flux values in NFPA-59A. Whereas the separation distance between two 35 
containers is determined by a detailed hazard assessment in EN-1473 (Raj and Lemoff, 2009). 36 
For large tanks with storage capacity over 265 m3, NFPA-59A requires the safe spacing 37 
between tanks no less than 1/4th of the sum of the diameters of adjacent tanks, while only 1m 38 
or 1.5m minimum distance is specified for tanks smaller than 265 m3 (NFPA-59A, 2016). In 39 
terms of the EN-1473, the minimum separation distance should be no less than half of the 40 
secondary tank’s diameter. Nevertheless, there are no fine subdivisions of separation distances 41 
according to the relationship between separation distance and tank diameter in these codes.  42 
In order to better understand the impact of separation distance/gap on tank layout design, 43 
engineers and researchers had conducted more studies based on the industrial standards. For 44 
instance, a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) study was carried out by Santos and 45 
Landesmann (Santos and Landesmann, 2014) to investigate the separation gap effect on the 46 
safety of fuel storage tank farms. A specific minimum safety distance recommendation was 47 
proposed. However, the analysis was conducted on storage tanks subjected to fire conditions, 48 
the explosion pressure was not taken into account. Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2017) had 49 
conducted a more detailed safety analysis on tank farm layout optimizations. An integrated 50 
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probabilistic framework along with some relevant procedures were developed to optimize the 51 
space collocation on the basis of different acceptable thermal radiation. Other literatures 52 
focusing on optimizing cost by means of different safety distances/gaps were also reported 53 
(Diaz-Ovalle et al., 2010; Jung et al., 2011; Patsiatzis et al., 2004). In the study of optimization 54 
of facility layout by Jung et al. (Jung et al., 2011), the gas explosion scenarios were modelled 55 
by conducting CFD simulation, the flame acceleration simulator (FLACS) was only used as an 56 
accessional calibrator to assess the financially optimized layout. The relationship between 57 
safety distance and explosion overpressure was not discussed. 58 
Overall, the models in the industry standards and the majority of current studies on safety 59 
distance determination are based on the flammability of the contents, thermal radiation data 60 
and financial risk management. Little attention has been paid on the consequence of gas 61 
explosion, such as the explosion overpressure and its effect on adjacent structures.  62 
In this study, the separation distance effect on gas explosion overpressure was thoroughly 63 
investigated. Experiments were conducted on a group of tanks. A series of tank layouts with 64 
different separation gaps were designed in the testing. The gas clouds were ignited inside a 65 
vented tank. CFD simulation was conducted to qualitatively study the relationship between the 66 
separation gap distance and explosion overpressure. Two different gas cloud coverage 67 
scenarios were taken into account. The internal and external pressures subjected to different 68 
separation gaps were calculated and discussed. 69 
2. Experimental tank group explosion tests  70 
In the tank group explosion tests, the cylindrical tanks designed according to American 71 
Petroleum Institute Standard (API-650, 2007) were used. All tanks are 1.0m in height and 1.5m 72 
in diameter.  Same as the tanks used in previous study (Li et al., 2017), the tested tanks are 73 
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made of steel Q345B with tensile strength 470 MPa and yield strength 345 MPa. The welding 74 
between the tank roof and wall has yield strength 450 MPa and tensile strength 530 MPa. 75 
2.1 Experimental details 76 
As seen in Fig. 1, a tank with two venting panels was surrounded by 7 enclosed tanks and 1 77 
upright truss fixed on the ground. 6 piezo-resistive sensors (CYG 1409, Kunshan Shuangqiao 78 
Sensors, China), with a pressure measuring range of 0 to 150 kPa, were used in the testing. 79 
Pressure sensors on the tank wall were mounted by using hex nuts, and rubber washers were 80 
used to ensure the impermeability of equipment. Signals from pressure sensors were logged on 81 
a 16-Bit A/D converter sampling at 100 kHz. Two sensors named as Sensor 1- (West-direction) 82 
and Sensor 1+ (East-direction) were mounted on the internal wall of the center tank to measure 83 
internal pressure, while another two sensors (i.e. Sensor 2 and Sensor 3) were fixed onto the 84 
neighboring tanks to measure external pressures.  Fig. 2 illustrates the sensor’s detail and 85 
location on the center tank. Extra two sensors (i.e. Sensor 4 and Sensor 5) were mounted on 86 
the truss to monitor the external pressure in the venting direction, and fire-resistant coating was 87 
applied for all sensors, as seen in Fig. 3. Ambient temperature was approximately 26oC in the 88 
field during the tests. Wind speed was 2.8 m/s. 89 
 90 
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Fig. 1 Tank group testing setup in 3D view 91 
  92 
(a) piezo-resistive sensor    (b) sensor mounted on the center tank wall 93 
Fig. 2 Piezo-resistive sensor detail and location on the tank 94 
 95 
(a) Two sensors mounted on the truss  (b) fire-resistant coating on a sensor  96 
Fig. 3 Sensors above the tank group and fire protection for sensors  97 
The tank located in the center had two symmetric venting areas with dimensions of 305×610 98 
mm2, as seen in Fig. 4 (a). The vents were kept as open during the gas mixing and explosion 99 
testing. A 0.015mm polyethylene film was used to confine an enclosed region with dimensions 100 
of 2300×2300×1500 mm3, the center tank was located inside the confined region, as seen in 101 
Fig. 4 (b). Four vales with cross-section size of 1.9 cm diameter were mounted on the center 102 
tank wall. Two of the valves were connected to air inlet and gas inlet, while another two valves 103 
on other side were connected to air outlet and gas outlet.  104 
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  105 
(a) Venting areas on the tank top      106 
 107 
(b) Methane-air mixing inlet & outlet valves 108 
Fig. 4 Center tank with two venting areas and four valves in the tank group explosion testing 109 
 110 
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 111 
     (a) Fan for gas-air mixing inside the tank       (b) Fan for gas-air mixing outside the tank 112 
Fig. 5 Locations of fans for gas-air mixing 113 
Two explosion-proof fans were used for the methane-air mixing. As demonstrated in Fig. 5(a), 114 
a fan and a recirculation pump were connected to the center tank to inflate and circulate air 115 
inside the tank, whereas another fan shown in Fig. 5(b) was used to mix the methane-air mixture 116 
in the space between the center tank and the film confined region. In order to ensure the 117 
homogeneity of the gas concentration inside the tank and the film confined region, 118 
approximately 20 min was required to inflate and mix methane and air. The gas concentration 119 
was measured by using an infrared methane analyzer, as seen in Fig. 6. The high speed camera 120 
and computer controlling system were located at about 25m away from the tank group, and the 121 
tanks with compressed gas were placed another 20m away from the high speed camera, as seen 122 
in Fig. 7. The resolution and shutter time of the HSVC were set at 2000–3000 fps and 1/50,000, 123 
respectively. Through-The-Lens (TTL) system was used to synchronize HSVCs with sensors. 124 
A 45m long gas pipe was used to supply methane from the compressed gas resources to the 125 
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testing tanks. The Gas Flow Control System (GFCS) used for methane-air gas filling and 126 
mixing is illustrated in Fig. 8. 127 
 128 
The fan to mix methane and air for the center tank is shown in Fig. 9 (a), the fan has an air 129 
pump to drive the flow circulation. Two circulate ducts were connected with the center tank. 130 
However, in order to make the gas mixing procedure easier, the fan was placed outside the 131 
confined film region, as seen in Fig. 9 (b). The other fan used to mix methane and air inside 132 
the confined film region is shown in Fig. 9 (c). The gas mixing for the center tank and another 133 
gas mixing for the confined film region were conducted simultaneously.  The air pump in the 134 
GFCS for gas concentration measurement is shown in Fig. 9 (d). 135 
 136 
Once the gas filling started, the fans and air pump were activated to circulate the flow inside 137 
the center tank and the region confined by polyethylene films. During the gas filling procedure 138 
(about 20 mins), the air pump (Fig. 9 (d)) connected to the infrared gas concentration analyzer 139 
(Fig. 6) and the gas filled region was constantly used. A probe connected to the air pump as 140 
seen in Fig. 10 (a) was placed inside the confined film region by one person, while the other 141 
side of the air pump connected to the infrared gas concentration analyzer provided up-to-date 142 
gas concentration data. As shown in Fig. 10 (b), another person synchronously removed the 143 
fan for the center tank, and the probe was also used to measure the gas concentration inside the 144 
tank. When the gas concentration inside the tank reached the same level (9.5 vol %) of that 145 
inside the confined film region, the homogeneous gas mixture for the whole region was 146 
guaranteed.  The hex nuts and rubber washers were then quickly installed to seal the valves on 147 
the tank wall after the measurement, as shown in Fig. 10 (b). 148 
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 149 
Fig. 6 Infrared gas concentration analyzer 150 
 151 
Fig. 7 Location of high speed camera, computer system and compressed gas resources 152 
 153 
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Fig. 8 Gas flow control system scheme 155 
  156 
(a) Fan for gas mixing for the center tank       (b) Fan outside the confined film region 157 
  158 
(c) Fan for gas mixing for the confined film region       (d) Air pump 159 
 160 
Fig. 9 Detailed control units in the Gas flow control system scheme 161 
 162 
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 163 
(a) Measurement for the confined region (b) Measurement for the tank after mixing 164 
Fig. 10 Methane-air mixture concentration measuring procedure  165 
The ignition system was remotely activated once all personnel evacuated far away from the 166 
tanks. As shown in Fig. 8, an electric spark plug was installed in the middle of the center tank. 167 
Center ignitions were used for all gas explosion tests in this study. A water bucket was placed 168 
on the top of the truss to provide cold water to the water cooling system, as seen in Fig. 11. All 169 
sensors were connected to each other by using two water tubes, and fire-resistant coating was 170 
applied. 171 
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  172 
(a) Water bucket on top of the truss  (b) Water tubes to connect sensors 173 
Fig. 11 Water cooling system  174 
2.2 Experimental layouts 175 
As shown in Fig. 12, three tank group layouts, namely with separation gap 500mm, 750mm 176 
and 1000mm, were considered to study the effects of separation gap between tanks on blast 177 
wave propagation and interaction with the tank group. The center tank was fixed onto a 178 
concrete ground, which was built with normal-weight Portland cement concrete with a standard 179 
compressive strength equal to about 20 MPa. Each tank’s weight was over 1.5 ton, overturning 180 
moment of tank due to recoil force was eliminated. In order to move the tanks to arrange 181 
different layouts, a crane truck as seen in Fig. 13 (a) was used. The final arrangement of the 182 
tank group is shown in Fig. 13 (b). 183 
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 184 
  185 
(a) 500mm separation gap between tanks     (b) 750mm separation gap between tanks 186 
 187 
(c) 1000mm separation gap between tanks 188 
Fig. 12 Tank group layouts in methane-gas explosion testing  189 
 190 
© 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
15 
 
 191 
(a) Hauling of tanks by using a crane truck to arrange the tank group layout 192 
193 
(b) Final tank group setup  194 
Fig. 13 Tank arrangement for gas explosion testing   195 
2.3 Experimental results and discussion 196 
Before the tank group experiments in this study, the authors had conducted other experiments 197 
of vented gas explosions occurring inside the same-scale cylindrical tanks (Li et al., 2017). The 198 
uncertainties, such as gas concentration, vent activation pressure and roof failure pressure, etc., 199 
had been studied. 200 
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The tanks used in the authors’ previous study (Li et al., 2017) were the same as the tanks used 201 
in this study, however, with different roofs and different venting areas. For different methane-202 
air volume concentrations, the stoichiometric gas concentration of 9.5 vol % resulted in the 203 
greatest explosion overpressure. Therefore, 9.5 vol % was chosen in this study to investigate 204 
the worst scenario of methane explosions. As indicated in the previous study, different vent 205 
opening setups led to different initial activation pressures, which eventually resulted in errors 206 
in measuring the first and second pressure peaks. In order to minimize the experimental error, 207 
all roofs of the center tanks were uniformly designed to be venting cover free. In terms of the 208 
uncertainty of roof failure pressure, different welding procedures in the authors’ previous study 209 
led to different roof failures. In the extreme case, the roof of the tank were propelled over 10 210 
m from the tank. Therefore, in this study, in order to prevent the occurrence of the above 211 
scenario, continuous welds were used for all tank roofs. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the 212 
sensor recording accuracy was eliminated by ensuring the data from two sensors inside the tank 213 
wall were synchronized. However, due to the budget and number limitations of the tank group 214 
experiments, other uncertainties associated with the tank group tests were not further 215 
investigated. 216 
High speed video camera was used to capture the flame propagation during combustion in the 217 
tests, as seen in Fig. 14.  The stoichiometric methane-air concentration of 9.5 vol % was used 218 
for all testing cases. Two sensors were installed on the center tank wall to record internal 219 
pressures. One sensor with pressure measuring range of 0 to 30kPa was mounted on one side 220 
of the center tank, as illustrated in Fig. 11 (b), whereas the other sensor with pressure measuring 221 
range of 0 to 150kPa was installed on the opposite side of the tank. During the test, signals 222 
from these two sensors were recorded by using a data acquisition instrument at a fixed sampling 223 
frequency of 100 kHz. The unfiltered raw data were shown in Fig. 15. The repeated 224 
experimental setups with the same sensors and data acquisition system were used for three 225 
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different separation gap cases (namely 500mm, 750mm, and 1000mm cases). The raw data 226 
were obtained by two pressure sensors at two different locations inside the tank. Both sensors 227 
worked properly and were synchronized that pressure-time profile of sensor 1- coincided with 228 
that of sensor 1+, which guarantees the repeatability and sensitivity of the collected data. 229 
However, high frequency noises were observed for all the recorded data. To remove the 230 
measurement noise, the Fast Fourier transform (FFT) method of data filtering was used, 1000 231 
Hz low pass filter was chosen for all testing results. Additionally, in order to compare with the 232 
CFD simulation data in the following section, the starting times of raw data were adjusted to 233 
zero. 234 
For demonstration purpose, only the recorded images with the 500mm separation gap was 235 
chosen to discuss the combustion progress. Four high speed video camera snapshots were 236 
shown in Fig. 17 for the explosion testing with 500mm separation gap, the corresponding 237 
timelines were indicated in the pressure-time curves of the internal sensor (i.e. sensor 1+), as 238 
seen in Fig. 16. The pressure-time data were filtered and compared with originally recorded 239 
data.  240 
   241 
(a) 500mm separation gap    (b) 750mm separation gap     (c) 1000mm separation gap  242 
Fig. 14 High speed video camera snapshots of different separation gap scenarios in gas explosion 243 
testing 244 
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 245 
(a) Unfiltered raw data recorded by the two internal sensors for 500mm case 246 
 247 
(b) Unfiltered raw data recorded by the two internal sensors for 750mm case 248 
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  249 
(c) Unfiltered raw data recorded by the two internal sensors for 1000mm case 250 
Fig. 15 Unfiltered raw data of internal overpressures for all separation gap cases 251 
 252 
Fig. 16 Filtered internal pressures with timelines for center tank with 500mm separation gap 253 
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    254 
(a) Time at 0.109 s        (b) Time at 0.123 s 255 
 256 
 257 
(c) Time at 0.149 s        (d) Time at 0.210 s 258 
Fig. 17 High speed video camera snapshots for tank group with 500mm separation gap 259 
The center tank had two openings without panels, while the outer region (dimensions of 260 
2300×2300×1500 mm3) was fully confined by using a polyethylene film. From the time of 261 
ignition to the time that the confined rectangular region was filled with unburned gas escaped 262 
from the center tank, the flame front inside the tank expanded spherically. During this time 263 
frame, the combustion resulted in a net rate of volume production exceeding the flow rate of 264 
unburned gas from the vent. Therefore, as seen in Fig. 16 (from ignition time to 0.109), the 265 
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internal pressure increased. An obvious pressure decrease was not seen due to the fact that the 266 
failure pressure of tank panel was zero (i.e. two openings were not confined). The outflow of 267 
unburned methane-air mixture from the vent opening eventually distorted the flame front (Fig. 268 
17 (a)). Consequently, low density burnt product during the combustion inside the tank was 269 
expelled due to the distorted flame front, which resulted in an increase in the flow. Such flow 270 
speed increased along with the expansion of the film confined volume until some gas leakage 271 
occurred through the film, resulting in a slight fall in the internal pressure, as seen in Fig. 16 272 
(from time of 0.109 s to the trough before time of 0.123 s).  273 
From Fig. 17 (a) to Fig. 17 (b), the flame front ignited the unburned methane-air mixture 274 
concentrated within the confined rectangular region, which led to a sharp increase in the 275 
internal pressures, as the second peak pressure shown in Fig. 16 at 0.123 s. Starting from 0.123 276 
s, the sideward polyethylene film on the edge of the confined region broke. A sudden pressure 277 
drop was hence observed due to the failure of film from time 0.123 s to time 0.131 s. However, 278 
the film located on the top of the confined area did not burst until the time of 0.149 s. During 279 
this time the external explosion within the confined region continued so that the flame surface 280 
area increased till the second failure of the film, which leaded to another pressure decline. A 281 
third pressure spike was subsequently seen at 0.149 s. 282 
From 0.149 s, the onset of burned methane-air mixture after the failure of all films coincided 283 
with oscillatory combustion. Meanwhile, burning velocities were enhanced by turbulence 284 
generated between burned and unburned mixture within the center tank. The induced flame 285 
acceleration was also boosted due to the turbulence interacted with the center tank and 286 
surrounding tanks. The methane-air mixture density interface became unstable during the flame 287 
acceleration, and Taylor instabilities (Bauwens et al., 2010; Bauwens et al., 2011; Cooper et 288 
al., 1986) were expected. The growth of such instability and oscillation was seen between 0.149 289 
s and 0.210 s in Fig. 16. The fourth pressure peak was observed at time of 0.210 s when the 290 
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flame area inside tank reached the maximum and encountered the tank walls. The burned 291 
mixture then had a decreasing rate of production from 0.210 s due to the reduction of flame 292 
area in later stage of combustion. However, the last pressure peak due to acoustic effect 293 
(Cooper et al., 1986; Tamanini and Chaffee, 1992; Van Wingerden and Zeeuwen, 1983) was 294 
not observed in this explosion test.  295 
In Fig. 18, the pressure-time histories of the case with 500mm separation gap were compared 296 
with the other cases with the separation gap 750mm and 1000mm.  As seen in the zoomed-in 297 
figure on the right corner of Fig. 18, the burning velocity of the gas mixture was reflected by 298 
the pressure increase rate in the highlighted triangle area. All pressure increase rates coincided 299 
with each other, indicating the laminar burning velocities for all cases were the same. In other 300 
words, the measuring and mixing of stoichiometric methane-air concentration (i.e. 9.5 vol %) 301 
in all tests were accurate. 302 
In the comparison, 500mm case showed the greatest pressure peaks before the 0.161 s, while 303 
750mm case had the smallest pressure peaks. However, after 0.161 s, a more regular pattern 304 
was seen that the change of separation gap distance from 500mm to 1000mm was inversely 305 
proportional to the fourth pressure peaks. Namely, the increase of the separation gap distance 306 
resulted in a decrease of the peak pressures at 0.210 s. The observed irregular pressure peak 307 
patterns before 0.161 s were due to the discreteness of the film failure. As explained before, 308 
the first three pressure falls were highly relevant to the failure pressure of the polyethylene film, 309 
which was unfortunately not controllable in the tests. The peak pressure appeared nearly 310 
immediately after the film breaks, especially for low pressure combustions in these tests.  After 311 
0.161 s all films were burned, the influence of turbulence within the tank and between tanks 312 
became more obvious. With a closer separation gap distance, the center tank had larger flame 313 
turbulence interaction with the adjacent tanks. The higher turbulence eventually resulted in 314 
higher pressure feedback to the internal pressures (Li et al., 2016; Ma et al., 2014). Therefore, 315 
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a decrease tendency of pressure peaks at 0.210 s was seen when the separation gap distance 316 
proportionally increased from 500mm to 1000mm.  317 
Table 1 summarizes all the external sensors’ locations and the recorded peak pressures. The 318 
pressure-time histories obtained by the four external sensors are shown in Fig. 19. It is seen in 319 
Fig. 19 (a) and (b) that increasing the separation gap distance from 500mm to 1000mm leaded 320 
to smaller maximum peak pressures at sensor 2 and sensor 3. The external pressures at the these 321 
two locations were more influenced by the turbulence generation. The narrower separation gap 322 
induced higher turbulence between the tanks. Therefore, the comubustion within the  750mm 323 
gap developed higher peak overpressure than that of 1000mm gap case, even though the 324 
internal pressure from the explosion center for 750mm gap case was initially lower than that 325 
of 1000mm gap case. However, for other sensors (i.e. sensor 4 and sensor 5) located above the 326 
vent opening, the external peak pressure development tendencies were the same as that of the 327 
internal peak pressure shown in Fig. 18. The above observation can be explain as: during the 328 
vented explosion, the high velocity flame impinged out of the vent vertically with consequent 329 
turbulence generated spherically. The impulse and pressure due to venting were more dominant 330 
in the vertical direction, and the obstacle/confinement  ratio in this direction was unchanged 331 
regardless of the variation of separtion distance. Whereas the majority of turbulence developed 332 
horizontally due to the changed obstacle ratio which was related to the changed separation 333 
distance. Unlike the turbulence influenced sensors in Fig. 19 (a) and (b), the pressures recorded 334 
by sensor 4 and sensor 5 above the vent were mainly subjected to the venting pressure with 335 
little turbulence ration. Therefore, the internal pressure of changing tendencies shown in Fig. 336 
18 directly affected those recorded by sensors 4 and 5 as shown in Fig. 19 (c) and (d).  337 
It is also worth noting that the oscillations of pressures after the peak pressures (at 0.151 s and 338 
0.152 s) for sensor 4 and sensor 5 became more obervious than the data recorded at sensor 2 339 
and sensor 3. Sensor 4 and sensor 5 are external sensors outside the tank in the venting direction. 340 
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The peculiar profiles with strong oscillations are mainly due to the locations of these two 341 
sensors. Unlike sensor 2 and sensor 3 which were installed on the neighbouring tank walls far 342 
away from the vent, sensor 4 and sensor 5 were directly subjected to the hot flame since the 343 
beginning of combustion. Therefore, sensor 4 and sensor 5 had longer exposure time to high 344 
temperature heat. Moreover, sensor 2 and sensor 3 were better-protected against wind within 345 
the tank group while sensor 4 and sensor 5 were not confined in the open air. In such a scenario, 346 
sensor 4 and sensor 5 became more sensitive, especially under longer time of hot flame 347 
exposure. More importantly, the pressure profiles of internal sensor 1 in Fig. 18 has strong 348 
oscillations between 0.15 s and 0.30 s, such oscillations are undoublely mapped to the recorded 349 
data in Fig. 19 (c) and (d). 350 
 351 
Fig. 18 Pressure-time histories recorded inside the center tank with different separation gaps 352 
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Table 1 Sensor locations and measured peak pressures. 353 
Sens
or No. 
Sensor 
location 
Tank Measured 
peak pressure for 
500mm case (kPa) 
Measured peak 
pressure for 750mm 
case (kPa) 
Measured peak 
pressure for 1000mm 
case (kPa) 
1- Internal wall 
@ W-direction 
Cente
r tank 
1.375 1.080 1.177 
1+ Internal wall 
@ E-direction 
Cente
r tank 
Same as 1- Same as 1- Same as 1- 
2 External 
wall @ W-
direction 
 
West 
tank 
0.632 0.553 0.470 
3 External 
wall @ SW-
direction 
South
-West 
tank 
0.442 0.326 0.289 
4 1500mm 
above the center 
tank 
Cente
r tank 
0.545 0.391 0.423 
5 2000mm 
above the center 
tank 
Cente
r tank 
0.451 0.278 0.332 
 354 
 355 
 356 
(a) Sensor 2         (b) Sensor 3 357 
 358 
(c) Sensor 4         (d) Sensor 5 359 
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Fig. 19 Pressure-time histories recorded at different locations outside the center tank with 360 
different separation gaps 361 
 362 
So far, only three experimental gas explosion tests were conducted. Due to the high cost of 363 
field explosion tests, a systematical investigation of separation gap effect on LNG tanks with 364 
more tests became infeasible. Therefore, further study was conducted by using CFD 365 
simulations, the overpressure generations inside and outside the vented tank were studied in 366 
the following sections.  367 
3 CFD simulation and validation  368 
Following the authors’ previous study on vented methane-air explosion overpressure 369 
calculation (Li et al., 2017),  the same CFD-based software FLACS (version 10.4) was used in 370 
this paper. FLACS uses Navier-Stokes equations and k model for turbulence simulation.   371 
Obstacles and walls in complex three-dimensional geometries are represented by using on-grid 372 
and sub-grid objects with computed porosity values. The database of chemical kinetics, 373 
momentum, energy balance equations, and special schemes for flame velocity and turbulence 374 
calculation are included (Arntzen, 1998; Ferrara et al., 2006; Hjertager, 1984, 1993). In FLACS, 375 
the combustion models for gas explosion simulation include BETA flame model and Simple 376 
Interface Flame (SIF) model, while for fire simulation, Eddy Dissipation Concept (EDC) is 377 
recommended. The SIF model, which was commonly used in vented or highly confined gas 378 
explosion studies (Bleyer et al., 2012; Li and Hao, 2017; Li et al., 2017; Vyazmina and Jallais, 379 
2016), was employed in this study.  SIF model solves compressible flows by modelling flame 380 
as an interface to ensure good representation of flame area in a coarse grid.  381 
3.1 Vented explosion simulation of tank group by using FLACS 382 
The experimental setup as seen in Fig. 13 was numerically modelled in FLACS. Fig. 20 shows 383 
the 3D geometry of the tank group with grid cells. The entire simulation domain dimensions 384 
were 18000×18000×18000 mm3. For each tank with dimensions of 1500mm diameter and 385 
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1000mm height, the distance from the tank to the external boundaries in non-venting direction 386 
(horizontal direction) is about 4 times larger than tank diameter. The distance from the tank to 387 
boundary is 18 times larger than tank length in explosion venting direction. Therefore, the 388 
requirement of distance from vessel to boundaries for vented gas explosion in FLACS was met 389 
(Gexcon, 2015). A non-reflecting boundary condition of “PLANE_WAVE” was used. This 390 
boundary condition was designed to reduce the reflection of the pressure waves at open 391 
boundaries. The pressure wave reflection is caused by setting a fixed pressure at the boundary. 392 
The PLANE_WAVE boundary condition extrapolates the pressure in such a way that 393 
reflections are almost eliminated for outgoing waves. The PLANE_WAVE boundary condition 394 
is recommended for explosions in low confinement and for far field blast propagation (Gexcon, 395 
2015). 396 
The grid cell size within the combustion region (about 4000×4000×4000 mm3) was chosen as 397 
0.05m (Li and Hao, 2017; Li et al., 2017), and all grid cells were modelled as cubical inside 398 
the enclosure to reduce the deviations of burning velocity and pressure development. About 70 399 
grids, which are much higher than required 8 grids in FLACS manual (Gexcon, 2015), were 400 
used at each vent opening. Other grid cells were stretched from the combustion region to 401 
external boundaries, the aspect ratio of grid increase was kept as 4%. Tank walls and roofs 402 
were assumed as rigid in all simulation. Ambient temperature of 26oC, which is approximately 403 
the same as the outdoor temperature in the field during the tests, was used, as well as the wind 404 
speed of 2.8 m/s. Atmospheric pressure of 1 ATM was adopted. The volume concentration of 405 
methane-air mixture was kept as stoichiometric at 9.5 vol%. 406 
In order to emulate the lightweight film used in experiments, the PLASTIC relief panel was 407 
chosen in FLACS. An UNSPECIFIED panel type was initially created, and the area-porosity, 408 
density and opening pressure were adjusted to meet the PLASTIC panel properties. It is seen 409 
in Fig. 20 (b) that the monitoring points (green points) were located at the same positions as 410 
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the sensors in the experimental setup, except that two extra monitors (i.e. sensor 6 and sensor 411 
7) were added to record sideward and external pressures inside and outside the tank group in 412 
non-venting direction. Sensor 6 and sensor 7 were fixed at the location about 1.1 m in vertical 413 
and 1.1 m in horizontal direction from the group center, while sensor 2 and sensor 3 attached 414 
on the adjacent tank walls move as the tanks were relocated in each case with different 415 
separation distances. The ignition, as shown in Fig. 20 (b), was located in the middle of the 416 
center tank. 417 
  418 
                                            (a) 3D geometry and grid cells     419 
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 420 
(b) Monitor locations 421 
Fig. 20 3D model of the tank group in FLACS simulation  422 
 423 
 424 
(a) Separation gap distance of 500mm    425 
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 426 
(b) Separation gap distance of 750mm 427 
 428 
(c) Separation gap distance of 1000mm    429 
Fig. 21 3D modelling of combustion by using FLACS  430 
 431 
 432 
3.2 Comparison of internal and external overpressures predicted by FLACS with 433 
experimental data 434 
Corresponding to the combustion progress as shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 17, the three-435 
dimensional modellings of three different vented explosion scenarios in FLACS were well 436 
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captured as shown in Fig. 21.  All overpressure-time history data were extracted from different 437 
monitors in FLACS, as shown in Fig. 22 and Fig. 23. In comparison of the internal pressures 438 
in Fig. 22, the first pressure peak and the maximum pressure peak were well predicted. The 439 
Taylor instability induced pressures after the maximum pressure peak (at 0.149 s in experiment 440 
and at 0.121 s in FLACS CFD simulation) were also well observed, even though the difference 441 
between the Taylor instability induced pressures in experiments were more obvious than that 442 
in CFD simulation. In both pressure-time curves, the 500mm separation gap scenario had larger 443 
pressure peaks, whereas the lowest third pressure peaks were observed in the 1000mm 444 
separation gap scenario. Generally, FLACS well predicts the amplitude of pressures and the 445 
general shapes of dominant peaks of pressures inside the center tank. Except that the pressure 446 
build-up in FLACS started sooner than that in experiments, which is due to the fact that the 447 
initial burning rate of flame in FLACS simulation was slightly faster. Such phenomenon had 448 
also been observed in other researchers’ studies (Ma et al., 2014; Pedersen and Middha, 2012). 449 
  450 
         (a) Data of 500mm case    (b) Data of 750mm case  (c) Data of 1000mm case     451 
Fig. 22 Comparison of experimental and CFD data of internal pressures recorded at monitor 1  452 
 453 
The earlier pressure build-up was also applied onto other obtained external pressures as seen 454 
in Fig. 23. The majority of the external pressure peaks in FLACS agrees well with the 455 
experimental data. At monitor 2 and monitor 3, the decline tendency of the maximum pressure 456 
with the increase in separation gap was well predicted. Whereas the differences among the 457 
maximum pressures subjected to different separation gaps were not obviously seen at monitor 458 
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4 and 5 in FLACS.  Additionally, the agreement of Taylor instability induced pressures and 459 
negative pressures between FLACS and experiments is satisfactory, despite the fact that the 460 
recorded pressure oscillations in the test at monitor 4 are much higher than CFD predicted data. 461 
As explained before, the explosion was vented from two vent openings, the sensor 4 was in 462 
direct contact with the combustion products. The signal of pressure acquisition was highly 463 
likely being affected by the high temperature heat of the vented combustion.  464 
According to the data in Fig. 23, it is again suggested that the increase of separation gap resulted 465 
in a decrease of the maximum pressures at monitor 2 and monitor 3. The turbulence generation 466 
between narrower tank gaps significantly increased the external pressures recorded at the above 467 
two monitors. Although the initial internal pressure inside the tank of 1000mm gap case was 468 
greater than that of 750mm gap case, the explosion occurred within the 750mm gap eventually 469 
induced greater turbulence, thereby generating higher pressures. However, different pressure 470 
development tendencies were seen at monitor 4 and monitor 5. In the CFD data, little 471 
differences among the pressure peak due to the effect of separation gap were seen. The 472 
spherically generated turbulence experienced zero obstacle/confinement ratio change in the 473 
venting direction whereas the separation gap exclusively varied in horizontal direction. 474 
Therefore, due to the little influence of turbulence in venting/vertical direction, the pressure 475 
peak changes recorded at monitor 4 and monitor 5 were negligible.    476 
All the maximum pressures are summarized in Fig. 24. Generally, FLACS simulation results 477 
have a good agreement with experimental results, although pressure peaks were slightly over-478 
predicted. 479 
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    480 
(a) Monitor 2      (b) Monitor 3  481 
  482 
(c) Monitor 4          (d) Monitor 5 483 
Fig. 23 Comparison of test and CFD data of external pressures recorded at different monitors 484 
 485 
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Fig. 24 Comparison of peak pressures recorded in the tests and CFD simulations at all 486 
monitor locations 487 
 488 
In order to further validate the accuracy of FLACS in vented gas explosion overpressure 489 
prediction. The experiments regarding explosion in vented cylindrical tanks from Moen et al. 490 
(1982) were used to compare with FLACS simulation results in this study. In the experiments 491 
by Moen et al. (1982), the large combustion tanks with dimensions of 10m long and 2.5m 492 
diameter were segregated into different confined regions by using orifice plates, as shown in 493 
Fig. 25. 494 
   495 
 496 
Fig. 25 Vented methane-air explosion configuration by Moen et al. (1982) modelled in 497 
FLACS 498 
The left end of the tank was closed and area ignition was applied on this side, whereas the tank 499 
was open on the right side. The volume of the segregated region was defined as the cross section 500 
area times the distance from ignition to the orifice plate. The orifice plate were placed at 501 
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different locations (from 1.65m to 9.33m away the ignition), therefore, different confined 502 
volumes were defined. The orifice plates had different blockage ratios (B.R. = 1-(d/D)2), which 503 
can be used to represent the different vent area ratio. 9.5 vol % methane-air mixture was also 504 
used. All the previous FLACS setups were kept the same. 505 
The experimental setup information, peak pressure data and FLACS simulation data were 506 
summarized in Table 2. It is seen that the FLACS simulation data of peak pressures 507 
satisfactorily agree with experimental data (Moen et al., 1982), indicating FLACS can 508 
accurately simulate the methane-air explosion from vented single tank as well. 509 
Table 2 Comparison of experimental results by (Moen et al., 1982) and and numerical 510 
results  511 
 512 
3.3 Simulation of additional separation gap scenarios with small gas cloud of 513 
2300×2300×1500 mm3  514 
Using the validated FLACS model, simulations of vented explosions of tank groups with 515 
additional separation gaps of 250mm, 1250mm and 1500mm were carried out. As mentioned 516 
in Section 2, the first three peaks of internal pressures were highly dependent on the failure of 517 
polyethylene film. In the tests, the failure pressures of 5 films on different sides of the confined 518 
region can be different. Such variations of failure pressure are difficult to control in field tests, 519 
whereas it can be eliminated by unifying the failure pressures on all PLASTIC relief panels in 520 
Case 
ID. 
Orifice plate (OP) 
distance from ignition 
Blockage 
ratio of OP 
Volume 
of confined 
region (m3) 
Peak 
pressure 
from 
experiments 
(kPa) 
Peak 
pressure in 
FLACS (kPa) 
1 2 plates @ 5.13m & 
9.33m 
0.30 45.80 
150 170 
2 2 plates @ 1.65m & 
5.13m 
0.50 25.18 
405 423 
3 No plate 0.00 49.09 12 7 
4 1 plate @ 1.65m 0.84 8.10 200 171 
5 1 plate @ 1.65m 0.30 8.10 66 65 
6 1 plate @ 1.65m 0.16 8.10 50 42 
7 1 plate @ 5.13m 0.50 25.18 270 275 
8 1 plate @ 5.13m 0.84 25.18 380 400 
9 1 plate @ 9.33m 0.50 45.80 90 67 
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CFD simulations. All PLASTIC relief panels were assigned zero opening pressures in the 521 
following study. Same as the small gas cloud used in experiments, the gap distance effect was 522 
investigated under gas cloud with dimension of 2300×2300×1500 mm3. 523 
 524 
(a) Monitor 1 525 
 526 
    (b) Monitor 2     (c) Monitor 3 527 
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 528 
(d) Monitor 4     (e) Monitor 5 529 
 530 
    (f) Monitor 6                  (g) Monitor 7 531 
Fig. 26 Pressure-time data at different locations corresponding to the cases with different 532 
separation gaps from gas explosion with a small gas cloud coverage 533 
 534 
 535 
(a) Monitors inside the tank group region      (b) Monitors outside the tank group region 536 
Fig. 27 Maximum pressures recorded at different monitors corresponding to the cases with 537 
different separation gaps from gas explosion with a small gas cloud coverage 538 
 539 
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As seen in Fig. 26 (a), the gap distance has little effect on internal overpressure inside the center 540 
tank as all plastic relief panels have zero opening pressures. All pressure peaks were almost 541 
identical for all the considered gap distances. On the other hand, obvious pressure weakening 542 
with the increase in the separation gap was seen at other locations, i.e., external monitor 2, 3 543 
and 6, which located on the surrounding tank walls. At these three monitors, the pressure 544 
development was highly dependent on the flame turbulence between tanks, hence the 545 
separation gap played a vital role in mitigating blast pressure. 546 
At the other external monitors (i.e. monitor 4, 5 and 7), the pressure decreasing tendencies are 547 
less pronounced than that of monitor 2, 3 and 6, as shown in Fig. 27. It is worth noting that the 548 
gas cloud dimensions were 2300×2300×1500 mm3, the external monitors of No. 4, 5, 7 were 549 
not in the gas cloud region. Separation gap between tanks has insignificant effect on the 550 
pressure wave propagation outside the cloud. With regard to this statement, justification can be 551 
made by relating this study to other researchers’ work. So far, limited gas explosion 552 
experiments were conducted with multi-obstacle arrays and different pitches/gaps between 553 
obstacles (Alekseev et al., 2001; Chan et al., 1983; Harrison and Eyre, 1987; Hjertager et al., 554 
1988; Mercx, 1995; Na'inna et al., 2013). For these studies, it was generally recognized that 555 
influence of separation distance between obstacles was an essential parameter in acceleration 556 
of turbulence and increase in explosion severity. Although in this study, larger scale tanks were 557 
used instead of small obstacles, the effect of separation gap between tanks in Section 2 was 558 
shown experimentally to have effect on explosion severity for monitors within the gas cloud, 559 
which agreed with the observations in the aforementioned references. Regarding the separation 560 
gap effect on external pressure outside of the gas cloud, a CFD simulation (Ma et al., 2014) 561 
based on RIGOS experiments (Van den Berg and Mos, 2005) showed that significantly small 562 
overpressures were recorded outside of the cloud during explosion. In other words, the 563 
turbulence development contributes little to overpressure built-up in the open space without 564 
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gas resource. The findings of separation gap effect on explosion pressures in and around the 565 
area of a tank group in this study can be used as a general guidance in safety design for medium-566 
scale tanks. 567 
Another noteworthy feature of the pressure-time curves is that the second pressure peaks are 568 
much smaller than the first pressure peak at all the monitoring locations, and negative pressures 569 
are negligible. The main reason is that the flame acceleration and its time outside the center 570 
tank are rather limited due to the small gas cloud volume, therefore, the turbulence induced 571 
pressures are relatively small. Higher second pressure peak with longer combustion duration is 572 
expected to be seen if the gas cloud volume increased.  573 
3.4 Simulations of explosions of tank group with additional separation gap distances 574 
with large gas cloud of 7000×7000×1500 mm3  575 
To investigate the significance of gas cloud volume on explosion pressures, the gas cloud 576 
coverage was increased to 7000×7000×1500 mm3, as seen in Fig. 28. All other setups were 577 
kept the same as those in Section 3.3.  578 
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 579 
Fig. 28 Gas cloud coverage for the tank group 580 
 581 
Pressure-time and impulse-time data were extracted from FLACS post-processor and shown in 582 
Fig. 29 and Fig. 30. Compared to the smaller gas cloud coverage in Section 3.3, the second and 583 
negative pressure peaks under larger gas cloud coverage became larger. For example, the 584 
second pressure peaks at monitor 5 and monitor 7 were even greater than the first peak when 585 
the separation gap distance between tanks was 250mm and 500mm.  586 
Additionally, the duration of the second peak was significantly longer than those of the first 587 
peak at all monitoring locations. In other words, the second peak contributes more to the total 588 
impulse, as seen in Fig. 30. To further investigate the influences of large gas cloud coverage 589 
on the pressure time histories, discussions were made with respect to the first peak, the second 590 
peak and the negative peak. 591 
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 592 
(a) Monitor 1 593 
 594 
    (b) Monitor 2     (c) Monitor 3 595 
 596 
(d) Monitor 4     (e) Monitor 5 597 
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 598 
    (f) Monitor 6                  (g) Monitor 7 599 
Fig. 29 Pressure-time histories at different locations with respect to different separation 600 
gaps from gas explosion under a large gas cloud coverage 601 
 602 
(a) Monitor 1 603 
 604 
    (b) Monitor 2     (c) Monitor 3 605 
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 606 
(d) Monitor 4     (e) Monitor 5 607 
 608 
    (f) Monitor 6                  (g) Monitor 7 609 
Fig. 30 Impulse-time data at different locations with respect to different separation gaps from 610 
gas explosion under a large gas cloud coverage 611 
 612 
 613 
   (a) First peak       (b) Second peak       (c) Negative peak 614 
Fig. 31 Peak pressure corresponding to different separation gap distances 615 
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616 
(a) Maximum pressure-gap distance      (b) Impulse-gap distance 617 
Fig. 32 Maximum pressure-gap distance and impulse-gap distance relations 618 
 619 
As seen in Fig. 31(a), the influence of separation gap on first pressure peak under large cloud 620 
coverage was similar to that under small cloud coverage shown in Fig. 27, and the apparent 621 
decrease of the second peak pressure with separation distance were observed at all locations, 622 
except at monitor 7 when the separation distance was 500 mm (in Fig. 31(b)). In general the 623 
largest values of the first and the second peak occurred when the separation distance was 624 
250mm.  However, the maximum negative pressures were observed when the separation gap 625 
was 500 mm among all the considered cases, and the negative peak pressure values did not 626 
show a monotonic decreasing trend with the increase of the separation gap. The negative 627 
pressures in Fig. 31(c) were reversal pressure peaks (below 0 kPa) obtained from Fig. 29. 628 
However, the magnitudes of negative peaks were smaller than the first and second peaks, which 629 
means the first peaks and second peaks were more dominant in combustion. Fig. 32 shows the 630 
maximum pressure peaks from the three groups and the impulse with respect to the separation 631 
gap distance. Compared to the results with small gas cloud shown in Section 3.3, when the gas 632 
cloud coverage was sufficiently large that all tanks were covered, all external monitors 633 
recorded the pressure peak decreasing with increasing separation gap distance. Among all the 634 
cases considered, 250mm gap resulted in the highest pressure peaks but the 500mm separation 635 
gap gave the largest impulse. 636 
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 637 
4 Conclusion and discussion 638 
In this paper, experiments were conducted to investigate the vented gas explosion with three 639 
different separation/safety gaps. Different pressure peaks at different combustion time were 640 
discussed. The observed internal pressures indicated that the first three peaks before Taylor 641 
instabilities were directly proportional to the failure pressure of relief panel. Pressure mitigation 642 
due to separation gap was only observed in the fourth peak of internal sensors and other 643 
pressure peaks at external sensors located between the tanks. 644 
The CFD simulation was conducted to investigate more vented tank group explosions with 645 
different separation gaps. The calibration of CFD simulation results is satisfactory. Based on 646 
the same scale testing setup, different cloud coverage scenarios were studied.  647 
For small gas cloud coverage, it is concluded that separation distance has little mitigation effect 648 
on internal pressure. Additionally, the secondary pressure peaks and negative pressure peaks, 649 
which were much smaller than first pressure peaks, were negligible for all monitors. Separation 650 
distance played an essential role in pressure mitigation only for monitors within the gas cloud 651 
coverage. 652 
For large gas cloud coverage, three distinct pressure peaks were obtained in this study. 653 
Generally, separation gap has little impact on the first internal pressure peak and first external 654 
pressure peak in venting direction. While obvious pressure mitigation phenomenon due to 655 
separation gap was seen for both of internal and external pressures at the second peaks. The 656 
negative pressure peaks were still the least dominant peaks for monitors within gas coverage. 657 
In terms of the maximum pressure, the smallest separation gap of 250mm in this study is 658 
deemed to be the most unsafe case regardless of the gas cloud coverage size. However, unlike 659 
the logical thinking that the smaller separation gap leads the higher impulse, the 500mm 660 
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separation gap instead of 250mm separation gap in the large gas cloud scenario resulted in the 661 
highest impulse. 662 
As a practical guidance, it is suggested in this paper that determination of the safe separation 663 
distance is dependent on the external pressure and impulse acting on the tank walls. Under the 664 
gas cloud coverage, a near-linear correlation between the maximum external pressure on 665 
adjacent tank wall and separation gap is expected. Therefore, pressure-wise, the safest 666 
separation distance between tanks should be as far as possible. However, in practice, the 667 
allowed design distance between gas storage tanks is normally limited. Within a certain 668 
distance, the 500mm separation gap case surprisingly has higher impulse than that in the 669 
250mm separation gap case as shown in this study. Therefore, in order to determine the safe 670 
distance, detailed CFD simulation is recommended if the allowed distance is limited and close 671 
to the tank diameter. Compared to the current regulations which are mainly based on the content 672 
flammability, thermal radiation and financial risk analysis, this study provides more insights 673 
on the consequences of vented gas explosion, such as the explosion overpressure and impulse 674 
applied on adjacent structures.   675 
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